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CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY:
SKEPTICAL CHALLENGES AND THEOLOGICAL
REFLECTIONS
by Aku Olavi Visala
Abstract. Some philosophers and scientists have argued that we
humans cannot be held morally responsible for anything. Invoking
results of the neurosciences and the cognitive sciences, they argue that
humans lack the kind of conscious control and awareness required for
moral responsibility. For theological ethics and Christian theology as
a whole, moral responsibility is indispensable. I will begin by out-
lining some empirical results that are invoked in support of moral
responsibility skepticism. I will, then, examine the subsequent dis-
cussion and the question why conscious awareness is central to moral
responsibility. Consciousness contributes to morally relevant control
over action in multiple ways. I will briefly examine some accounts
of conscious control that are resistant to the skeptical challenge. Al-
though the empirical results might lead us to revise the degree and
range of conscious control, there seems to be enough of it to ground
many everyday practices of responsibility. I will conclude the article
with some theological reflections.
Keywords: cognitive science; consciousness; free will; moral re-
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Recently, some philosophers and scientists have argued that we humans
cannot be held morally responsible for anything. Invoking recent results
of the neurosciences and the cognitive sciences, they argue that (most)
humans lack the kind of conscious control over action (“free will”) that
moral responsibility requires. It seems to us that our actions are, most of
the time, brought about by our conscious intentions and reasons that have
led to the formation of those intentions. The scientific free will skeptics
argue that this “seeming” is, in fact, false—a kind of illusion. In reality, our
sense of conscious control does not track the actual causes of our actions.
It follows from this, the argument continues, that humans seldom—or
never—fulfill the conditions of moral responsibility.1
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Skepticism toward conscious control over action can be motivated by
both scientific and more philosophical considerations. In this article, I will
focus on scientifically motivated skepticism (although the empirical and
the philosophical case for skepticism are not completely distinct).2 Skepti-
cal worries have generated an enormous amount of philosophical and sci-
entific literature in the last two decades.3 My aim is to introduce the core
issues to a theological readership in order to invite theologians to exam-
ine the psychological assumptions behind their accounts of moral respon-
sibility more carefully. Although contemporary philosophical theologians
have been eager to talk about various metaphysical and doctrinal issues
surrounding free will (grace, sin, providence, divine determinism), they
have said very little about concrete psychological issues revolving around
consciousness and control.
I will begin by outlining some empirical results that are invoked in sup-
port of free will skepticism. I will then examine some responses to these
challenges and look at the role of consciousness in action control in detail.
One possible response is to adopt an account of moral responsibility that
foregoes the need for conscious control of action altogether. Although this
is an interesting proposal, I will present some arguments against it and go
on to discuss the other option, that is, the possibility of conscious control
even while acknowledging the thoroughgoing influence of nonconscious
mental mechanisms in action generation. To this I will dedicate the bulk
of this article. Finally, I will conclude with some Augustinian theological
reflections.
Empirical Evidence for Epiphenomenalism
I take it to be uncontroversial that most accounts of Christian religious and
moral life entail that individuals have significant direct and indirect con-
trol over their moral and spiritual lives. This control is a presupposition for
much that constitutes such a life. Christians blame and praise one another;
they assess each other’s moral characters, and invite each other to account
for their actions and omissions. For religious life especially, both inter-
subjective and intrasubjective moral appraisals have crucial importance. A
person’s relationship to herself often consists of various self-appraisals that
guide her moral life. Emotions and attitudes, such as regret and guilt as
well as self-gratitude and praise, are significant for a person’s self-image and
for the regulation of her moral life. Moral appraisals are also at home in re-
ligious social lives. Intersubjective attitudes of love and forgiveness are held
in high esteem by Christian ethics. In addition, moral and spiritual life in-
volves an aspect of development and change. Sanctification is a process
of purification and moral development. A person is supposed to become
more aware of her sins, regret and repent them, and develop virtues instead
of vices. Here, the Christian is invited to develop her moral awareness of
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the significance of her actions as well as her capacities for self-control and
self-reflection (see, e.g., Zahl 2020).
One central function of a theological account of moral responsibility is
to make sense of the practices and attitudes that constitute moral and spir-
itual life, as well as to show that they are properly justified or grounded.
It is obvious that in order to account for these practices and attitudes, we
must assume that a person has some measure of conscious control over
her actions and internal mental life. If it turned out that humans overall
were incapable of controlling their actions in a morally significant way, it
would be difficult to see how, for instance, making moral appraisals, guilt,
and blame could be justified at all. Moreover, if it turned out that humans
lacked the necessary mental resources to shape their internal mental life
or moral character, it would render at least some accounts of virtue-based
moral and spiritual life untenable. This would also apply to any account
of sanctification that requires some measure of cooperation between
the individual and God. This is why theologians must engage with the
nitty-gritty details of human moral psychology, instead of just developing
accounts of free will and moral responsibility in “the metaphysical sphere”
and discussing issues like divine determinism and God’s omniscience.
A number of philosophers and scientists have recently argued for free
will skepticism on the grounds that conscious mental processes are epiphe-
nomenal with respect to actions (Caruso 2012). We humans seem to have
very little conscious control over our actions, because we lack significant
awareness of those factors that, in fact, cause our behavior. We have no
control over most of our action-generating mental mechanisms, because
they operate outside conscious awareness. For early defenders of these ar-
guments, like psychologist Daniel Wegner (2002), the results imply that
our conscious will is an illusion. If we further assume that a person cannot
be held morally responsible for an action that she did not control, it seems
that moral responsibility is threatened.
The target of the skeptic is basic desert moral responsibility. The core
idea of just deserts is that a person deserves to be blamed or praised simply
on the basis of the moral worth of her actions. Philosopher Derk Pere-
boom expounds the idea:
For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in this sense is for
it to be hers in such a way that she would deserve to be blamed if she
understood that it was morally wrong, and she would deserve to be praised
if she understood that it was morally exemplary. The desert at issue here
is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve to be blamed or praised
just because she has performed the action, given an understanding of its
moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialist
or contractualist considerations. (Pereboom 2014, 2)
The reason why some empirical results threaten moral responsibility is
that they seem to suggest that when a person forms an intention to act,
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the person is unaware of the causes that lead to the formation of that in-
tention. The subsequent action might be caused by the intention, but the
intention is not caused by the person’s conscious reasons, but by some-
thing else entirely. Her consciously accessible reasons, desires, and values
are ultimately epiphenomenal with respect to the action. If this is the case,
those values that the person is aware of and which she endorses, might
be mostly irrelevant with respect to her actions. As a consequence, they
cannot function in the role of explaining or otherwise making sense of
her actions. Epiphenomenalism threatens moral responsibility, because it
suggests that the actual causal chain that leads to an action bypasses the
person’s consciously endorsed reasons to act. But it is the person’s values,
reasons and intentions that are supposed to ground our moral appraisals of
her. If her actions do not “flow” from her reasons, intentions, and values,
it does not make sense to blame the person for her actions.
Let us say that an agent commits a morally wrong act while sleepwalk-
ing and would not act in such a way, if awake. Suppose also that the state
of sleepwalking is such that the person is not aware of what she is doing.
Now, it would seem unjustified to blame the agent for that action, because
the agent lacks control over her actions. While sleepwalking, the agent is
neither aware of the moral significance of her actions nor are her values and
reasons connected to the morally wrong action. If the agent is blamed for
the action, it is open to her to offer various excuses: she can complain that
the blame is unfair, since she did not intend to commit the action; she did
not know what she was doing. Had she had conscious control, she would
have acted otherwise. The skeptic insists that most people most of the time
are in an analogous situation: they lack conscious control over their ac-
tions, so any attribution of basic desert moral responsibility is unjustified.
A central assumption of the debate is that basic desert responsibility
requires the fulfillment of two conditions: the “free will condition” or con-
trol condition and the epistemic condition.4 The skeptical argument at-
tacks both simultaneously: people do not know what they are doing and
they lack conscious control over it. This reveals the crucial role that con-
sciousness plays in both of these conditions. If a person has very little or
no conscious awareness of her mental life that leads to an action (reasons,
intentions), she cannot be said to control the action. Moreover, if a person
lacks conscious awareness of the morally significant features of an action,
the person does not know what she is doing.
One significant source of evidence for the skeptical claim is the neu-
roscience of conscious volition and decision-making. Most famously,
neuroscientist Benjamin Libet conducted a series of experiments about
how conscious decisions to act are temporally related to measurable brain
events. Without going into the details, Libet-style experiments involve the
measuring of brain activity in some way (originally by electroencephalog-
raphy, EEG, subsequently by functional magnetic resonance imaging,
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fMRI) and its timing in relation to the conscious decision to act. The act
measured in the experiments is usually a basic motor movement, like flex-
ing of one’s hand, such as in the original Libet (1985) experiment. The
surprising finding in the original study was that there is an activation
of the motor cortex 400 milliseconds before the subject became aware
of her conscious decision to act. Later, many others, like neuroscientist
John-Dylan Haynes (2013) and his colleagues, have advanced the basic
paradigm and presented further evidence as to how simple decisions of
test subjects can be predicted from fMRI data seconds before the subjects
become conscious of them (Soon et al. 2008). One skeptical interpreta-
tion of these results is that the conscious decision to act is not the cause
of the action, but rather an effect of the triggering of the motor neurons,
which takes place prior to any conscious awareness. Before any conscious
forming of an intention, the brain is already preparing to perform the ac-
tion. So, the conscious intention to act cannot be the cause of the action,
but rather a side effect of brain mechanisms working outside conscious
awareness.
For critics of free will, the Libet paradigm demonstrates how our con-
scious awareness of forming an intention to act can come apart from the
actual causes of actions. Wegner (2002), in particular, has argued that our
sense of acting intentionally is not the cause of our actions, but an illu-
sion created by nonconscious mental processes. Wegner and his research
group devised many experiments that were able to induce a sense of own-
ership over actions in subjects, while the subjects actually had no such
ownership over their actions. Wegner also describes experiments that pur-
port to show that subjects can be put in conditions where they in fact
initiate actions but lack the conscious awareness of bringing that action
about. Similarly, a sense of intentional action can be induced in a test
subject, when the subject is not really acting at all. These experiments
raise multiple questions about the phenomenology of free action and the
nature of conscious will, which have been extensively discussed in the lit-
erature (Nahmias 2002). Wegner himself took the evidence to show that
we humans are never in a position, where we consciously control our ac-
tions. Instead, the sources of our actions are independent of our conscious
selves.
Many philosophers take the cognitive sciences as a whole to provide
evidence against conscious control over actions. If we have learned any-
thing from cognitive psychology, it is that most mental processes work
outside our conscious awareness. There is a significant amount of evidence
for pervasive automatism in the human cognition, or so the skeptical ar-
gument goes (Kihlstrom 2008). Particularly well-known are the various
hypotheses about the modular structure of human cognition. According
to original modularity hypothesis of Jerry Fodor (1983), many cognitive
systems, especially those that categorize and process sensory information,
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are modular in nature, that is, their processes are fixed, isolated from one
another, and their inputs and outputs are not affected by the central cog-
nition. Their workings are what Fodor calls doxastically impenetrable,
namely, permanently outside conscious access.
Later, many cognitive scientists have defended the massive modularity
thesis, according to which all mental processes are more or less modular
in this sense (Barrett & Kurzban 2006). An ardent defender of massive
modularity, Peter Carruthers (2006), argues that conscious will is an il-
lusion, because our awareness of our mental states floats free of the actual
causes of our actions. Conscious volitions and intentions are not the causes
of our actions, but rather post hoc products of interpretive mechanisms,
stories that integrate our actions and self-image, as it were. According to
Carruthers (2006, 408), “… if it can be shown that the only form of ac-
cess that we have to our own intentions and decisions is interpretive—in
this respect like the access that we have to the intentions and decisions of
other people—then there is no such thing as conscious willing or conscious
deciding.”
Carruthers (2006, 406–13) argues that this is in fact the case, because of
the way in which our knowledge of our mental states is generated. Accord-
ing to him, our own understanding of the contents of our minds is based
on our cognitive capacity to understand other people. We humans auto-
matically and habitually interpret and explain the actions of other people
by attributing them various mental states, like beliefs, intentions, and de-
sires. This same exact process is how we attribute beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions to ourselves. However, these mind-reading modules have no access
to those modules that generate our actions. They are interpretations that
do not track the true causes of our actions (Carruthers 2009; Gazzaniga
2011).
In addition, automatism is also supported by social psychology, where it
has long been acknowledged that the individual’s behavior often depends
on nonconscious social cues. This is especially pertinent in situationist
views of moral behavior. According to situationism, the bulk of our moral
behavior is to be explained by immediate environmental causes rather
than factors involving our internal features, like personality, intentions,
and moral character. Social psychologists have created a number of inge-
nious experimental settings, like Stanley Milgram’s (1974) obedience to
authority experiments and the Stanford Prison experiment (Haney, Banks,
Zimbardo 1973) in order to show the extensive, nonconscious influence
of the social context, especially in the case of moral action. These stud-
ies highlight the role of implicit social roles and cues in the regulation of
moral behavior. Given the truth of situationism, it would seem that our
behavior in many morally significant situations would be guided by non-
conscious cues and factors of the situation rather than our own consciously
endorsed commitments and attitudes (Nelkin 2005). On the situationist
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reading of the results, these implicit cues are the main causes of moral be-
havior in specific circumstances, not the character, values, and beliefs of
the individual. The link between our commitments, values and intentions
and our actions is crucial for moral appraisal. If they are mostly irrelevant
in explaining an individual’s moral behavior in a given situation, it seems
that moral responsibility is severely undermined.
No Consciousness Needed for Responsibility?
One way of avoiding the skeptical challenge would be to insist that con-
scious control of action is not required for moral responsibility after all.
There are two ways doing this. First, one could argue that while control
is required for moral responsibility, one does not need that control to be
conscious. In other words, an account of control can be provided that does
not include conscious access to relevant mental states. This would neatly
bypass the skeptical challenge. Second, one could forego the whole notion
of control altogether and ground moral responsibility on something else.
Next, I will briefly consider these possibilities. I will begin from the second
option.
In contemporary literature, control-based accounts of moral responsi-
bility have competitors that look impervious to the skeptical challenge. In
what follows, I will stick to Neil Levy’s (2014a, 11–12) practice and call
these expressivist accounts of moral responsibility. The core idea is that
moral responsibility is grounded in the relationship between the agent’s
attitudes, judgments and evaluations and her actions (Wolf 1990; Arpaly
2002; Smith 2005). An agent can be held morally responsible for an ac-
tion if that action expresses or represents the evaluations, attitudes, and
judgments of the agent. Notice, that such features of the agent can be in-
voluntary and outside the control of the agent.
In what follows, I will examine the expressivist account of George
Sher (2009), who has directly discussed the issue of consciousness and
responsibility. Sher criticizes what he calls the searchlight view of moral
responsibility. According to this view,
an agent’s responsibility extends on as far as his awareness of what he is do-
ing. He is responsible only for those acts he consciously chooses to perform,
only for those omissions he consciously chooses to allow, and only for those
outcomes he consciously chooses to bring about. (Sher 2009, 4)
Sher argues that the searchlight view is false and puts forward a number
of everyday cases of moral appraisal that seem to speak against it. If the
searchlight view were true, it would rule out our responsibility over actions
that were caused by ignorance, lack of imagination or poor judgment.
However, we habitually hold people responsible precisely for such lapses
of attention and judgment.
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Sher mentions a famous situation in Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp
Fiction (1994), where Vincent (played by John Travolta) accidentally
shoots another person, who was sitting at the backseat of his car. Vin-
cent is brandishing a loaded weapon around and, in his agitation, acci-
dentally fires it with head-splattering result. This lands Vincent and his
hitman colleague Jules in deep trouble. It is obvious Vincent did not in-
tend to fire the weapon and perhaps was also ignorant that it was loaded.
Given the searchlight view, Vincent would not be responsible for shooting
of his passenger. If moral responsibility requires conscious control, Vin-
cent does not seem to be responsible. However, it seems rather obvious
that while Vincent’s action was not consciously intended or controlled,
it was a result of his poor judgment and lapse of awareness. He should
have been more careful—should have known better. As a consequence,
it seems obvious that Vicent cannot completely escape blame in this
situation.
Sher goes on to develop an alternative to the searchlight view, along
the lines of expressivist theory of moral responsibility. Sher argues that an
agent can be held responsible for those actions that flow out of the agent’s
deeply held judgments and beliefs. This is the reason why such accounts
are sometimes called deep self or real self –accounts in the literature. The
deep self of the agent is constituted by a nexus of mental features (inten-
tions, evaluations, and tendencies) and their causal histories. Most of these
features are involuntary and outside the agent’s control. Moreover, in many
cases, the agent herself is not aware of these features, but her actions are
nevertheless brought about by such features. The person can justifiably be
held responsible for actions flowing out of these features even if the person
is ignorant of them, because those actions have their roots in the person’s
core psychology.5
Sher’s account would explain neatly why Vincent is blameworthy for his
misfiring. Although Vincent did not intend to fire his gun, there is a deep-
seated failure in Vincent’s psychology that renders him responsible for the
shooting. Vincent should have checked whether his gun was loaded and
he should have been more careful. He failed to do so, because of his easily
aggravated and careless tendencies that are very much a central part of who
he is. Given that Vincent is a hitman and gangster by profession, Vincent’s
ignorance expresses his judgments about the value of other people’s lives
(especially those of idiots). Vincent is clearly ignorant of these features of
himself, but that ignorance does not excuse him, because that ignorance
can be traced back to his deep-seated judgments that constitute the kind
of person he is.
An expressivist account of moral responsibility seems resistant to skepti-
cal challenges, at least initially. Sher would not be bothered by Libet-style
experiments, since these experiments only measure the subject’s awareness
of his conscious initiation of action. Furthermore, an expressivist account
Aku Olavi Visala 649
would not be challenged if it turned out that humans lacked conscious
awareness of many of their reasons, attitudes and even intentions driv-
ing their actions. Indeed, some defend expressivist accounts of respon-
sibility precisely because they consider them less susceptible to skeptical
challenges, unlike control-based accounts (Arpaly 2002).
In the context of this article, I cannot go into the debate about whether
the expressivist account is a plausible theory of moral responsibility. Nev-
ertheless, I will present some reasons why I find it as an unsatisfactory
response to the skeptical challenge. First, there is experimental evidence
on folk intuitions about moral responsibility that speak against the ex-
pressivist view. In a set of experiments, Joshua Shepherd (2012) asked
subjects to react to vignettes that described nonconscious behavior and
those describing conscious behavior. One of the key results was that the
subjects associated free will and moral responsibility with behavior that
was accompanied by consciousness rather than nonconscious mechanisms.
Shepherd also conducted experiments to find out whether the folk view
corresponds to the expressivist theory. The results were surprising. Shep-
herd (2015a, 938) concludes, “the right interpretation, in my view, is that
consciousness is central to folk views of free and responsible action, and
that the way in which it is central is not captured by extant Deep Self
Views.”
Another defect of the expressivist account is that, as Gregg Caruso and
others have argued (Caruso and Morris 2017), it is not deep enough to
ground the kind of moral responsibility that is at stake in the skepti-
cal argument. Recently, philosophers have distinguished different aspects
of moral responsibility (Shoemaker 2011). Attributability is at the core
of the expressivist argument. An action can be attributed to an agent,
when the action can be taken as an expression of the agent’s deeply held
judgments and evaluations. Such an action is something that the agent
owns. For the expressivist, attributions of this kind are enough to ground
a wide range of responsibility attitudes, like blame and praise. However,
Caruso (2018) has suggested that while the expressivist view might be
able to ground some measure of moral responsibility in the sense of at-
tributability, this might not be enough for the kind of basic desert moral
responsibility described above. There are powerful arguments in favor of
the view that basic desert responsibility requires not just attributability
but some measure of accountability. In addition to attribution, the agent
is also required to be accountable for that action in the sense that she can
be expected to provide justification for them (McKenna 2012). Provid-
ing justifications clearly requires conscious access to one’s intentions and
reasons for acting. If consciousness-involving accountability of this kind
is necessary for basic desert responsibility, then the expressivist account
cannot ground basic desert.
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Finally, there is some doubt whether the expressivist view can manage
without consciousness even in its own terms. Contrary to Sher, Levy ar-
gues (2014a, 88–90) that in order for the agent’s actions to express the
agent’s judgments and evaluations, conscious mental processes are needed
to mediate between the agent’s actions and judgments and values. With-
out conscious access, the Deep Self of the person is not connected to the
person’s actions in such a way as to allow for moral evaluation.
Imagine now that our sleepwalker stabs someone to death. To some ex-
tent, the sleepwalker can be responsive to the environment: he grasps the
right tool and chooses a target. However, the person’s Deep Self does not
drive the stabbing. Rather, there are basic motor processes that are respon-
sive to the physical features of the environment, but the responsiveness to
the person’s values is missing, because conscious awareness of the situation
is missing. What consciousness does is that it makes morally relevant fac-
tors of the situation (the victim is innocent, for instance) such that they
can interact with the person’s Deep Self. Without conscious awareness,
moral features of the situation “do not interact with the broad range of
attitudes constitutive of his evaluative agency. The do not interact with
his personal-level concerns, beliefs, commitments, or goals” (Levy 2014a,
89). So, in order for the actions of an agent to express her deeply held
judgments, goals, and beliefs, the agent must be, at least at some point,
consciously aware of having such attitudes.
The discussion on expressivist views teaches us an important lesson.
Sher and other are clearly right about something: “if agents must be con-
scious of all the mental states that shape their behavior, no one would ever
be responsible for anything” (Levy 2014a, 36). The skeptic is surely cor-
rect in claiming that our conscious access to our mental life and the moral
features of various situations is limited and spotty at best. Those who seek
to respond to the skeptical challenge must, therefore, show that there can
be moral responsibility grounding control over action despite the evidence
of spotty conscious access.
Control After the Skeptical Challenge
The discussion around the skeptical challenge is vast and I cannot even
begin to cover it all here. However, I will highlight some features of the
debate that open the door for the possibility of conscious control over
action.
First, one rather direct way to respond to the skeptical challenge
is to point out that there is plenty of evidence suggesting that con-
scious cognitive processes feature prominently in explanations of many
kind of behaviors. Social psychologist Roy Baumeister and colleagues
(2011, 351) conclude, “the evidence for conscious causation of behav-
ior is profound, extensive, adaptive, multifaceted, and empirically strong.”
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Although Baumeister and colleagues admit that we often perform actions
that are not consciously initiated, this says nothing about the significant
contributions that consciousness makes with respect to behavior in other
ways.
There is research suggesting that conscious processes provide the hu-
man cognition the ability to simulate future states of affairs, plan for var-
ious contingencies, control some intuitive responses (especially emotional
responses) and plan for the future. Particularly relevant for our case are
results about long-term implementation intentions, which “translate gen-
eral, abstract intentions into specific behavioral plans, of the form “If X
happens, then I will do Y.” Dozens of careful studies have confirmed that
these cause changes in behavior over and above merely intending, desir-
ing, goal setting, and valuing” (Baumeister, Masicampo and Vohs 2011,
336; Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006).
There is also evidence for conscious control in the sense people can
modify and override automatic responses. Oftentimes, emotions directly
trigger actions. However, when a person consciously reflects upon the
emotion and its possible consequences, the person can thereby prevent
himself from acting upon the emotion. Similarly, there is evidence that act-
ing on negative emotions can be prevented by prompts from other people.
Moreover, consciousness contributes to self-control in many ways (Mele
2020). This can be shown by experimentally impairing conscious reflec-
tion, which usually results in a situation, where the person’s desires (that
have not been endorsed) take over more easily. It seems that at least some
automatic processes can be modified, if their workings are brought to con-
scious awareness. Baumeister has developed a model of “willpower” or self-
control that is based on such results. His “energy model of self-control” has
been the subject of much debate (Baumeister, Tice, Vohs 2018). Regard-
less of the fate of the energy model, research on self-control is progressing
and there is significant evidence that persons can consciously, albeit indi-
rectly, control their internal mental life (like emotions) as well as control
their actions via intentionally shaping their environment.
This last point can be utilized as a response to the problem raised by
situationism. Although there are many implicit social cues that drive be-
havior, “consciousness seems to reduce the power and influence of many
of these situational influences” (Baumeister, Masicampo and Vohs 2011,
350). We could follow Manuel Vargas (2013) and turn the whole situation
upside down. Rather than take social psychology experiments to under-
mine conscious control over action, we might argue that such experiments
show the opposite. When people learn about such experiments and be-
come aware of their tendencies to submit to authority or blindly follow
socially prescribed roles, the effect of these context-dependent tendencies
can be significantly mitigated.
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One critical response to this suggestion is that the situational influences
on behavior are so numerous that no one is able to be aware of such influ-
ences, when entering into a morally relevant situation. An average person
cannot be expected to know all the relevant psychological studies. Not
to mention to be able to take all their results into account when acting.6
These considerations show that direct control over situational influences
might be, in many cases, very difficult. They do not show, however, the
impossibility of indirect control. When a person becomes aware of, say,
a tendency to submit to authority or to avoid helping people for morally
irrelevant reasons, the person can develop various skills and tendencies to
resist such influences. So, we could say that increasing knowledge about
implicit social cues and other previously nonconscious factors influencing
our behavior can actually enhance the degree of control we exercise over
our actions, not simply reduce it.
Let us now move on to the neuroscientific experiments emerging from
the Libet paradigm. Enormous amounts of ink have been spilled over this
issue (Brass, Furstenberg, Mele 2019). Many philosophers have expressed
their doubts about whether such experiments can show the overall lack of
conscious control over behavior.
Levy (2014a, 20–24) argues that the results of Libet-style studies and
Wegner’s studies are—despite initial appearances—irrelevant for assessing
whether people are morally responsible. The problem with studies in the
Libet paradigm is that they measure the timing of the subject’s becom-
ing aware of her intention to act. But why would we think that immedi-
ate awareness of one’s proximate intention to act would be necessary for
control over action? In many cases of stereotypically free and responsi-
ble action, direct proximate intentions are missing. Consider, for instance,
driving a car. A competent driver acts in multiple ways at once: watch-
ing traffic, coordinating bodily movements of hands, legs and responding
to various rules and cues. None of these require conscious initiation or
even conscious awareness when they are performed. Nevertheless, there
is indirect conscious control: the driver can become aware of the various
components of driving and modify them, if needed. Furthermore, driv-
ing a car is also a stereotypical example of intentional action: there is an
overall intention that the agent is consciously aware of having, but the
details of the implementation (motor coordination, perception, feedback
mechanisms) are performed automatically.
Alfred Mele (2009) makes a distinction between distal and proximal
intentions: proximal intentions are decisions to act immediately and dis-
tal intentions are longer term commitments to achieving some goal. He
argues that in Libet experiments, the subjects have formed a distal inten-
tion to participate in the experiment and flex their hands at some point.
The concrete implementation (proximal intention) of that flexing is au-
tomatized. So, even if we admitted that no brain correlate of a conscious
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intention was found in Libet-style studies, it would not rule out there be-
ing an overall intention to act (distal intention).
Many critics have suggested that Libet experiments deal only with
morally irrelevant actions, like flexing one’s hand (Levy 2005). These are
a far cry from morally relevant decisions that require deliberation. One
cannot generalize the results of such studies over all actions, including
complex moral actions. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that
the readiness potential measured in Libet experiments does not emerge
in cases of complex moral decisions (Maoz et al. 2019). Levy also points
out that there is no consensus as to what the readiness potential is and
what it represents. Mele (2009), for instance, suggests that it could sim-
ply be something that prepares the brain to form intentions. Some studies
suggest that the readiness potential does not perform the function that Li-
bet attributes to it (Alexander et al. 2015). These points undermine the
skeptical argument based on Libet studies.
Moving onto research on automatism, Levy argues that Wegner has not
been able to demonstrate that conscious awareness of acting and the actual
act are disconnected. Although various illusions of conscious acting can be
induced in specific experimental setting, this does not show that conscious
awareness is always dissociated from acting. Levy takes visual perception as
an example. There are cases of disorder (like blindsight) where the aware-
ness of perceiving something comes apart from actually perceiving some-
thing. Clearly,
it would be a mistake to think that actual perception and taking oneself to
perceive are not very reliably, and indeed causally, linked. A double disso-
ciation is good evidence that there is not an exceptionless link between the
items dissociated, in either direction, but it is not good evidence that there
is no direct causal link between them. (Levy 2014a, 19)
So, it seems that while Wegner is able to demonstrate that our awareness
of acting and actually acting might come apart, he has not shown that
there is a nonconscious mechanism that explains both in all cases (see,
also Nahmias 2002). Levy (2014a, 24) concludes, “It is very likely to be
false that we are always, or even often, conscious of the precise moment at
which a decision is made. But there is little reason to think that this fact
threatens moral responsibility.”
At this point, we should make some important distinctions about the
scope of the skeptical argument. One question is the range of the skep-
tical challenge: is it supposed to apply to all human actions? Some inter-
pretations of the Libet paradigm and some of Wegner’s claims imply a
universal range. In other words, all actions are such that conscious men-
tal states contribute nothing to them causally. Many have been skeptical
about this strong, universal claim. It became apparent above that there
might be many morally relevant actions that fall outside the range of the
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skeptical attack in this sense. As a universal thesis based on experimen-
tal results, the skeptical claim is not very plausible. Another question is the
degree to which conscious control plays a part in explaining actions. Again,
the skeptical thesis can be interpreted categorically: there is no conscious
control over action whatsoever. As such, the above results and arguments
suggest that this categorical interpretation is likely false.
However, even if the universal range is denied and there is evidence
that in some cases the degree of conscious control is higher than zero, the
skeptical argument retains some of its power. Shepard (2015b, 330–31)
is spot on when he writes, “the general claim is that the causal impact is
surprisingly insignificant. This is a claim about the degree of conscious-
ness’s involvement, and given the current state of knowledge, replies will
be about the degree of consciousness’s involvement.” So, the more plausi-
ble (and still moral responsibility undermining) skeptical challenge is not
that conscious mental states are epiphenomenal with respect to all actions,
but rather that the range of consciously controlled action and the degree
of control are both surprisingly small—or at least smaller than we tend
to think (Caruso 2015). The conclusion of the skeptical argument is not
that humans are incapable of moral responsibility per se, but rather that
the argument forces us to introduce significant revisions to our moral re-
sponsibility practices. Surprisingly, many actions fall outside the range of
responsible action completely and the degree of conscious control we have
over them is smaller than we think.
Consciousness and the Epistemic Condition
When the conclusion of the skeptical argument is formulated in the more
plausible way, as indicated above, the debate becomes more difficult. One
should classify the range of actions to which the skeptical conclusion is
supposed to apply and the degree to which conscious control is lacking.
This task cannot be taken up in one article. However, let me briefly exam-
ine some accounts of conscious control that are compatible with empirical
results and retain a significant degree of control over the range of many
kind of actions, especially over many everyday moral actions.7 According
to these views, the fact that our conscious access to our action-generating
factors is spotty at best is still compatible with morally significant degree
of control.
We must consider the notion of consciousness itself. The skepti-
cal argument derives its power from findings that suggest that con-
scious mental states have very little to do with action. But what is the
kind of consciousness that is in doubt here? The concept of conscious-
ness can be understood in many ways that are not necessarily relevant
for moral responsibility. The sleepwalker example above suggests that the
sleepwalker lacks creature consciousness, namely, that the person is not
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awake at that time. Another notion is phenomenal consciousness, which
refers to one possible feature of some mental states, namely, that they
involve a specific “feel” or experienced quality as to what it is like to be
in that state (Chalmers 1995). Given the controversial nature of phenom-
enal consciousness, I will remain agnostic as to whether a person is re-
quired to be capable of phenomenal consciousness in order to be morally
responsible.
However, it seems that the skeptical argument is not after creature con-
sciousness or phenomenal consciousness. The sleepwalker lacks another
type of consciousness: she seems to lack access to her mental states. On
the crucial question of how this access should be understood, there is dis-
agreement in the literature. A prominent defender of the skeptical argu-
ment, Gregg Caruso (2012) adopts a form of the higher order thought
(HOT) theory of consciousness, while one critic Neil Levy (2014a) de-
fends a global workspace theory of consciousness. Fortunately, the dissim-
ilarities between these two accounts of consciousness need not bother us
too much here. As far as I see it, they both converge on the central claim
that the cognitive function of consciousness is that of integration of in-
formation from many modular subsystems and broadcasting integrated
representations so that modular subsystems can have access to them. It is
this function that makes consciousness central for both the control and
epistemic side of responsibility.
On the HOT, an agent is access conscious (actual or dispositional) of
some mental state when she can represent herself as being in that state. The
subsequent representations are called higher order representations (Caruso
2012, chapter 5.3). Crucially for our purposes, these higher order rep-
resentations are such that they are available for HOT, like the process
of decision-making, weighting of options and forming of intentions and
plans. The benefit that access consciousness provides to a modular mind is
that it allows for the flexible integration of outputs from multiple systems
and the broadcasting such representations across systems that would oth-
erwise be distinct. Formed in these terms, the skeptical challenge is this:
it seems that most causes of human behavior, both mental and external,
are such that they are not accessible by those systems that form higher or-
der representations. Similarly, the content that plays a role in higher order
representations plays only a small or insignificant role in the causation of
behavior.
Levy thinks that this limited access is not an ultimate threat to moral
responsibility.8 There are plausible accounts of control over action that
are compatible with limited conscious awareness of mental contents and
that there is, in most cases of moral action, the capacity to gain access to
relevant knowledge in order to ground moral appraisals. With respect to
the latter—epistemic criterion—Levy argues that moral appraisals of the
person can be grounded if the person has conscious access to those features
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of the situation that explains “its moral valence” (Levy 2014a, 37). To be
responsible for an action, the person must have access to those features that
make the action morally good or bad. What the agent needs to be aware of
are facts that explain the moral significance of a particular action, like the
badness of theft or the goodness of giving to charity. Such features need to
be personally available (accessible) to the agent effortlessly and in such a
way as to be used in online reasoning (Levy 2014a, 33). This awareness is
indicated by the ability to report the content, namely, to explain it, when
asked. Availability of this kind also makes it possible for the content to be
widely broadcasted across multiple cognitive systems.
Levy argues that this kind of conscious access is central in explaining
many cases of moral behavior, which involves moral reflection, decision-
making and responsivity to shared norms. The skeptic overplays her hand,
when she claims that many or most moral actions are accounted for
by nonconscious mechanisms. Behavior driven by nonconscious mech-
anisms can be complicated and responsive to triggering features of the
environment, but it is nevertheless too inflexible and insensitive to ex-
plain the width of flexible, culturally sensitive agency that most in-
stances of human moral behavior exhibit. To explain this, we must—
according to Levy—postulate a wide range of behaviors that have con-
sciousness as a significant component. As I already mentioned above,
Levy adopts the global workspace theory, which was originally formulated
by Bernard Baars (2002) but has been later developed by Stanislas De-
haene and others (2011). Dehane and others identify consciousness as net-
work of a distributed set on neurons that connects, collects, integrates, and
broadcasts information across various independent systems. For Levy, the
most crucial function is that of global broadcasting. Without conscious-
ness, the outputs of individual mind/brain mechanisms would not come
together and be available to other mechanisms to use as input.
Levy’s response to the skeptic is, then, that while the skeptic might be
able to explain some actions, like flexing of hands or various illusions of
conscious acting, by invoking nonconscious mechanisms, it does not fol-
low that complex moral behaviors can be explained such. Furthermore,
such results do not show that people overall lack conscious access to rel-
evant features of most moral situations. The situationist challenge, of
course, reveals how pervasive implicit cues are and how much they can
shape moral behavior. However, it does not show that people overall lack
access to morally relevant features of the situation or that the degree of
control over actions in such situations is so small, that people should be
excused.9
Levy (2014b) also discusses complex cases, where the agent is generally
conscious but lacks awareness of some specific aspect of her actions. Many
skeptics of moral responsibility have referred to the extensive experimen-
tal literature on implicit bias, like sexism and racism in hiring practices,
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for instance, Uhlmann and Cohen (2005). Consider a person who hires
someone less qualified for a job, because of an implicit bias to view male
candidates more qualified than female candidates. In these cases, it is typ-
ical that the male candidate appears more competent than the female one
despite objective criteria.
It would be tempting to say that such a person is liable to blame, given
the expressivist account of responsibility: indeed, it seems that such an ac-
tion would express the person’s deeply held attitudes and judgments about
males and females and thus qualify as a stereotypically responsible action.
However, Levy (2014a, 92–97) argues that this is not the case. Although
the hiring decision of the person is clearly sexist, the cognitive bias at work
in this case is outside the person’s awareness. Let us suppose that the per-
son does not consciously endorse sexism and would reject it, if given the
opportunity. Indeed, this is often the case with implicit biases. The reason
why the person would not be morally responsible in the case of unjust
hiring is that he was unaware of his actual selection criterion (the bias)
and instead operated on the basis that the male was indeed more com-
petent than the female. It was this (false) information that was globally
broadcast. Because of this, the person’s deeply held attitudes and evalua-
tions were interacting with false information and, therefore, not expressed
in the person’s behavior. Indeed, Levy (2014b) suggests that implicit atti-
tudes in general are not robust enough to ground moral attributions.
Consciousness and Control
We can now return to the link between consciousness and control. Ac-
cording to a very basic notion of control, by controlling an action “agents
deploy behavior in the service of motivational states” (Shepard 2014, 396),
like intentions. So, a person controls an action, when that action falls un-
der the content of the intention and that intention plays a causal role in
producing the action. Following Alfred Mele, Joshua Shepard suggests that
the content of an intention is a plan: an intention includes a representa-
tion of what the end state will look like. Control is the agent’s ability to
succeed in implementing the intention via action. We should also note
that, since success comes in degrees, control also comes in degrees. An
agent can succeed to implement the intention to a high degree or a low
degree. Like Levy, Shepard (2015b, 328–29) also argues that many low-
level features of actions are explained by automatic motor systems that
control the implementation of intentions, which are higher up in the hi-
erarchy of control. Conscious control does not extend to such functions.
However, conscious intentions can make a critical causal contribution to
a wide range of actions. The control is, for the most part, executive rather
than implementational, that is, conscious intentions provide the overall,
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coarse-grained goal of the action, whereas initiation and implementation
are, for the most part, automatic.
Let us return to the case of a person driving a car. Levy (2014a, 74–
75) explains the automaticity involved by postulating the existence of
action-scripts. Action-scripts are sets of motor representations that direct
individual motor actions and are responsive to various environmental cues.
In most cases, action-scripts are learned through conscious attention and
training, but having learned them, the agent need not consciously at-
tend to them. Driving involves a set of such action-scripts, like chang-
ing gears and the complex process of steering a car. Normally, when we
drive, we trust the action-scripts to do their work without conscious aware-
ness. However, if something unusual and unexpected happens, conscious
awareness steps in and begins to deliberate between various action-scripts.
So, “conscious processing is needed for the flexible modulation and the
interruption, or concatenation, of action scripts. Only when the agent is
conscious do a very broad range of internally and externally generated cues
modulate behavior” (Levy 2014a, 79).
This kind of conscious control is not threatened by Libet-paradigm
studies or arguments about extensive automatism in human cognition. It
is also compatible with the fact that the person has spotty access to the fac-
tors that cause her action in a given moment. Nevertheless, it leaves intact
a degree of control that allows for moral responsibility.
Let us consider one specific account of control-based moral
responsibility.10 One of the most discussed accounts in the literature is that
of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998). For Fischer and Rav-
izza, what matters for moral responsibility is that the action has its roots in
the person’s cognition. This happens when the person’s action producing
mechanisms are sensitive to a variety of reasons (reasons-responsiveness)
and those mechanisms properly belonging to the person (mechanism own-
ership). When the agent’s actions are products of reasons-responsive sys-
tems that belong to the agent, the agent can be said to exercise guidance
control over that action. Guidance control of this kind is distinct from
regulative control, which refers to the agent’s ability to act otherwise. It is
also distinct from notions ultimate control (Kane 1996) prevalent in the
literature. The exercise of guidance control, for Fischer, is the minimum
threshold for responsibility.
One might initially think that guidance control requires no con-
scious awareness at all. It seems possible that an agent might act in a
reasons-responsive way without being consciously aware of doing so.
In his discussion on the issue, Levy argues that despite the appearances
guidance control indeed requires significant input from consciousness.
“We exercise guidance control over our actions if we would recognize rea-
sons, including moral reasons, as reasons to do otherwise, and we would
actually do otherwise in response to some such reason in a counterfactual
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scenario” (Levy 2014a, 109). According to Fischer, it is not enough to be
minimally reasons-responsive, like the sleepwalker mentioned above, who
is clearly responsive to some features of the environment. The sleepwalker
is in control of her actions to some degree, but this degree is so low as
to allow for moral responsibility. The sleepwalker’s action scripts are not
regularly responsive to moral reasons; instead, they are responsive to only
a very narrow set of external cues. Responsibility-level sensitivity requires
responsivity to a larger set of factors, especially moral reasons. Without
conscious access to morally relevant features of situations, moral reasons
are not integrated and broadcasted across cognitive systems.
Another feature of guidance control that requires conscious awareness is
that of mechanism ownership. Crucial for the reasons-responsive account
is the notion of taking responsibility, or mechanism ownership. As Pere-
boom already noted above, morally responsible actions must belong to the
person performing them. The person must have ownership over them. For
Fischer and Ravizza, most psychological mechanisms and tendencies are
not the person’s own doing. However, the person can take responsibility
over them and their effects by forming true beliefs about their functions
and integrating them into her view of herself as an actor.
As far as I can see, the reasons-responsive account of control is quite
resistant to the skeptical challenges presented above. First, the reasons-
responsive account acknowledges that control comes in degrees, since
reasons-responsiveness also comes in degrees. The empirical results, espe-
cially those of Libet and Wegner, do not undermine the possibility of mod-
erate reasons-responsive action in most everyday moral situations. Second,
the skeptical results do not undermine the possibility of mechanism own-
ership. As we already noted, situationism clearly shows that taking respon-
sibility for some moral tendencies in our moral behavior might turn out to
be rather difficult. In this sense, the empirical results should make us more
careful in making moral judgments of people’s actions in complex social
situation. However, this difficulty does not rule out the possibility of at
least moderate-degree of control via taking responsibility and developing
practices and skills to overcome biases and tendencies.
Some Augustinian Reflections
Let us now summarize the discussion above. First, the results of psychol-
ogy and cognitive science point toward the fact that most human mental
processes have significant nonconscious components. However, despite the
skeptical worries, there are reasons to think that a significant degree of con-
scious control is still possible over a wide range of human moral actions.
Notice, that my defense includes the compatibilist theory of control of Fis-
cher and Ravizza. Most skeptics will criticize this account of control, but
the arguments would not be—for the most part—scientific or empirical.
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I would also like to emphasize that in order to respond to the empirical
skeptical challenge thoroughly, one should examine various types of moral
actions in multiple contexts in order to determine the range and degree to
which nonconscious factors play a part in generating actions. In this sense,
the skeptical challenge has not been completely dispelled here. It might
turn out that the range of nonconscious influence is so broad and the de-
gree in which nonconscious systems feature in some actions is so high that
we must revise some of our responsibility practices (Caruso 2015, 2018)
to an uncomfortable degree. However, I do maintain that the thesis of uni-
versal epiphenomenalism is hardly supported by the empirical evidence.
Let me conclude with some theological reflections on these re-
sults. One interesting feature of both Sher’s and Levy’s views is what they
imply about the acting self. They imply that the acting self cannot be
identified with those features that are consciously accessible at a given
time. The responsible agent is constituted by a much larger set of facts that
can be accessed from the first-person perspective. For Levy (2014a, ix),
the conscious self is just a tiny sliver of the totality of mental life. For
Sher (2009, 121–22), the self includes the causal features of the body,
environment and history that uphold the agent’s judgments, beliefs, and
other mental features.
Such an account of the nature of the responsible agent fits naturally into
an Augustinian framework of the self and the will. In this framework, the
agent is always dependent on history, context, and other people in ways,
which go beyond the agent’s control. We are not self-determining or self-
defining creatures, but creatures that mostly find ourselves having certain
goals, desires, and characters. Our wills are not our own making. Accord-
ing to Jesse Couenhoven (2017, 38), Augustine does not see the will as a
distinct faculty of the person’s soul, separate from reason. Instead,
One’s uoluntas seems to reflect on the whole person in a way that a merely
passing whim or fancy—in spite of the loves, desires, or wishes that those
inevitably involve—does not. In a deep sense, your uoluntas is who you are
as a person.
One does not have to be aware of one’s ultimate desires, loves and deeply
held judgments in order for those to be constitutive of the one’s core self.
Not only do these features often escape conscious awareness, they also es-
cape conscious control. When Augustine claims that the will of the person
is not under her control, he means that the overall outputs of the person’s
reason, moral judgment and appraisal come outside conscious awareness
and control. Even if one acquires conscious access to some of these outputs
of one’s mental apparatus, that still does not entail control over them.
Another theologically interesting suggestion can be distilled from the
discussions above. It seems that the agent’s experiences associated with be-
ing the source of her actions (the sense of initiating an action, the sense
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of ownership of that action) are not necessarily veridical. This claim could
have a number of potential theological applications. It could be invoked
to explain situations where divine agency and the experience of human
agency overlap. Our commonsense assumption is that if another agent in
fact causes my action, I lack the appropriate experience of being the source
of my action. When this intuition is applied to God, it seems that God’s
actions and my agency are at odds.
Consider a practical case as an illustration. In 428, Augustine wrote a
pastoral letter of advice to a man named Firmus, who was struggling with
whether he should become a Christian or not.11 Firmus has apparently
read a significant amount of Christian literature and is inclined to take
baptism. However, he feels he is not as convinced about the Christian
truth as he should be in order to sign up. Inspired by Augustine’s earlier
texts, Firmus thinks that only God can change a person’s will from unbelief
to faith. As Augustine himself had many times argued, coming to faith is
ultimately something that God does, not the human being. Therefore, it
is up to God to bring it about that the person consciously wills to do good
and accept baptism. Since Firmus does not experience such an act of God,
he decides that it is better to wait for it than to take matters at his own
hands, as it were.
Augustine’s response to this worry is interesting for our topic. He says
that a person’s conscious decision to exercise her will in uncertain condi-
tions is compatible with the fact that God ultimately causes her to act.
Augustine explains:
Do not wait until he wills it (nec expectes quando uelit), as if you were going
to offend him if you willed it first. For, whenever you have willed it, you
will be willing it with his help and by his working. His mercy, of course,
anticipates you so that you may will it, but when you will it, you yourself
certainly will it. For, if we do not will when we will, then he does not give
us anything when he makes us will.12
Given the above discussion on the experience of conscious willing, we
might put Augustine’s point in the following way: there is no incompati-
bility between the agent consciously settling a difficult process of decision-
making by “just deciding” and the fact that such a decision is also caused
by God. In other words, when God brings about an intention in an agent,
that agent does not necessarily experience God’s actions as extrinsic or
herself as simply a passive object of God’s actions. Instead, the agent’s own
“settling of her will” whereby she forms an intention to act can also be
brought about by God. Even if one does not first experience the “settled-
ness” or “firmness” of an intention (i.e., one does not experience one’s will
as settled with the option of accepting baptism) and settles it, this process
can still be a result of God’s will. Such options should be interesting to
explore further.
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Finally, a modest account of control, such as the reasons-responsive ac-
count of Fischer and Ravizza, is a good fit with Augustinian theology, pre-
cisely because of its inherent compatibilism. Augustinian theologians are
often forced to make sense of human moral responsibility in the light of di-
vine determinism. Although Couenhoven (2013) has argued that Augus-
tine himself comes close to contemporary expressivist accounts, Michael
Preciado (2019) has recently argued that Reformed views of moral respon-
sibility, especially that of Jonathan Edwards’, resemble more closely the
control-based account of Fischer and Ravizza than anything else. Adopt-
ing something like the reason-responsive account would provide the divine
determinist an explanation of how humans can be responsible under di-
vine determinism as well as a way to respond to the skeptical challenges
arising from the sciences.13
Notes
1. Free will skeptics often disagree as to how this conclusion affects our moral responsibil-
ity practices. Some suggest that because we lack conscious control over our actions, we should
radically reject or revise our practices, like blaming, punishing, and praising (e.g., Waller 2011).
Others hold that some moral responsibility practices can be salvaged: perhaps holding one an-
other responsible has some significant benefits for the human community as a whole that justify
such practices even without free will (Shaw, Caruso, and Pereboom 2019).
2. For philosophical cases for free will skepticism, see Pereboom (2014), Waller (2011),
and Levy (2012). See also Pereboom and Caruso (2018).
3. See, for example, Baumeister, Mele, and Vohs (2010); Pockett, Bank, and
Callagher (2006); Clark, Kiverstein, Vierkant and (2013); and Sinnott-Armstrong (2014). For
introduction, see, for example, Caruso (2018) and Nahmias (2010).
4. A number of textbooks confirm this. See, for example, Timpe (2008) and McKenna and
Pereboom (2016).
5. Here, Sher is following the lead of other philosophers, who accept the expressivist view
of moral responsibility, especially Smith (2005). However, Sher differs from Smith and others
by adding something to the picture: not only is the responsible self-constituted by practical
judgments, but also by the causal processes that are necessary for the existence for the deliberative
process of practical judgments. See Sher (2009, 128–33).
6. I want to thank the anonymous reviewer for this point.
7. I want to point out that I am bypassing many of the philosophical debates about free
will skepticism here. In what follows, I will invoke accounts of moral responsibility that are
compatibilist in nature. Many skeptics like Caruso (2012), Pereboom (2014), Levy (2012), and
Bruce Waller (2011) have multiple philosophical arguments against such accounts, which I do
not assess here. They maintain that a correct account of moral responsibility must be an incom-
patibilism one. A complete response to the skeptical challenge would have to respond to various
arguments from manipulation, luck, and determinism as well. This article restricts itself to the
empirical skeptical challenge only.
8. Notice, that Levy is a free will and moral responsibility skeptic himself. However, he
does not think that skepticism is supported by empirical results about the lack of conscious
access.
9. For Levy’s response to Carruthers and others invoking the fallibility of our self-
knowledge, see Levy (2014b).
10. There are also accounts of nonconscious control in the literature (e.g., Suhler &
Churchland 2009).
11. My discussion of this topic is indebted to Timo Nisula’s unpublished paper “Nec ex-
pectes quando uelit (ep. 2*, 7)—Augustine’s persuasions on voluntas.” The English quotations
of Augustine are Nisula’s translations (2017).
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12. ep. 2*, 7: “nec expectes quando uelit, quasi offensurus eum si ante tu uelis, cum
ipso adiuuante atque operante uelis, quandocumque uolueris. praeuenit quidem te misericor-
dia eius, ut uelis, sed cum uoles, tuutique uoles. nam si nos non uolumus, quando uolumus, non
ergo nobis aliquid ille confert, cum efficit ut uelimus.”
13. The Academy of Finland graciously funded the research for this article. I would also
like to thank the two anonymous referees for invaluable comments.
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